Abstract-In this paper, we introduce the concept of pattial protection and propose an efticient solution for providing partial multicast protection given the dual-homing architecture in the access network. In the dual-homing architecture, each destination is connected to two edge routers to enhance the survivability in the access network. The routing algorithm which finds a path from the source to each edge router holds the key for the multicast protection. We study the problem of tinding the best partial multicast protection tree for the multicast session given the dual-homing architecture assuming that the hop count on each path is limited.
I. INTRODUCTION Multicast is a means of one-to-many or many-to-many communication scheme. Many bandwidth-intensive multicast applications, such as high-definition television, video and video conferencing, distance learning, etc., become widely popular with the advances in optical transmission technology. It is vital to efficiently protect critical multicast sessions against link or node failures. Yet protection is more challenging for multicast communications since one noddink failure will affect a number of multicast destinations. On the other hand, the large number of destinations in a multicast session certainly makes it harder to provide protection €or multicast communications.
In the literature, several multicast protection schemes have been proposed to provide 100% protection against single link failure 131, [9] , [lo], [ll] , which requires disjoint paths from the source to each destination. Classified by the granularity of disjointedness, three general approaches can be applied. A straightforward way is to compute t w o link-disjoint multicast trees. One serves as the primary multicast uee, and the other serves as the backup multicast tree [9] . However, it is hard and even impossible to find two link-disjoint multicast uees for a large scale multicast tree. Alternative ways include segment protection [ll], [12] andpath protection [11].
Modern networks can no longer limit the options of providing protection only to the extreme cases: with 0% protection or with 100% protection against single link failure. Instead, partial protection should be provided against single link failure, which is to find two paths from the source to the destination with minimum shared links. If there is one link failure on the disjoint links along the two paths, protection can be provided, while if there is one link failure on the shared links along the two paths, protection can not be provided. Therefore, such two paths can provide partid protection again single link failure.
In [13], we proposed a partial multicast protection scheme based on the dual-homing architecture, which was originally proposed to enhance survivability for the access network [5], [8] . In a dual-homing architecture, a host in the access network can be connected to two P edge routers. Under such an architecture, the two paths from the source of the multicast session to the two edge routers provide certain degree of protection for the data uaffic from the source to the destination. Figure 1 illustrates one example of dual-homing protection for a multicast session composed of source H1 and destinations of H2 and H3.
H2 is connected to edge routers A and B. There are two paths from H1 to H2, Hl-C-F-A-H2 and Hl-C-B-H2. Since these two paths are disjoint in the core network, H2 can receive data from H1 irrespective of any link failure in the core network. H3 is attached to edge routers D and E. The two paths from H1 to HI3 are Hl-C-F-D-H3 and Hl-C-F-E-H3. These two paths share a link C-F in the core network. If any link fails along the two paths except link C-F, H3 can receive data through the alternative path.
Clearly, the two edge routers to which a destination is attached determine the level of protection from the source to the destination. To quantify the protection level from the source to a destination, we introduced the concept of viilnerability [ two paths from the source to the two edge routers the destination can connect to. The overall optimization objective is thus to minimize the total vulnerability of the multicast session.
To achieve such an objective. two problems are involved subject to different network scenarios. One is to keep the routing algorithm unchanged in the core network and assign two edge routers to each destination such that the total vulnerability of the multicast session is minimized. named as the edge roiiter assignmentproblem. The other is to determine a multicast routing tree such that the sum of the vulnerability between every edge router pair of the multicast tree is minimized assuming that the edge router pair each destination can connect to is predetermined, named as the best partial multicast prutectiun tree problem.
We studied the first subproblem in j131. In this paper, we focus our study on the second problem. Considering the total cost of the multicast uee, we set a constraint of the number of the hops on the path from the source to each destination assuming that the cost of each edge is a constant. Hence, the key to solving the problem is to solve the 2-best paths problem with hop limit.
The best path pairs problem was generally defined as the Kbest paths problem which finds K paths as diverse as possible and with the lowest total cost. The problem of finding Kbest paths has been studied in [ll, [71, [41. In [4] , an optimal solution is given for finding K-best paths without hop limits using minimum cost network flow (MCNF) algorithms. However, we show that the 2-best paths problem with hop limit is NP-complete by showing its special case, the 2-disjoint paths problem with hop limit is NP-complete. merefore, the best partial multicast tree problem is NP-complete. We derive a lower bound for the problem based on the optimal solution to the problem of minimizing the vulnerability between every edge router pair without hop limit. We then propose the Partition and Sharing (PAS) algorithm to solve the problem. The efficiency of the PAS algorithm is evaluated by simulations and compared with the computed lower bound.
Section II presents the problem statement and proves its NPcompleteness. Section III presents the PAS algorithm and derives a lower bound. Simulation results are presented and discussed in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
We model the network as an directed graph G =< V: E >,
where V stands for the set of nodes, including the source. destinations and routers, and E stands for the set of links between nodes. For simplicity, we assume the cost of each link is unity. Let P k l be the path from s to destination d k through edge router r k l , and Pka be the path from s to destination d k through edge router r k 2 . Let B(s, d k ) be the set of links shared between path Pkl and path P k 2 , which is defined as:
be the set of edge routers which will participate in the multicast tree. Our objective is to find a multicast routing tree from s to R such that the total vulnerability for the destination set. which is denoted by CdkED P ( s ! d k ) . is minimized subject to the constraint that any path from s to any destination will be no more than H hops. For those edge routers shared by different destinations, the path from the source to the edge router is also shared by those destinations. This problem can be formulated by an integer programming model. We use the following notations: (6) and (7) ensure that each edge router has one-unit incoming flow on the path from source to each edge router and has zero outgoing flow, respectively. Equation (8) guarantees for each intermediate node the incoming flow equals the outgoing flow if it is on the path to each edge router, Equation (9) ensures hat the outgoing flow from each intermediate node on the path from the source to each edge router is at most 1. Equation (10) ensures &at the incoming flow at any intermediate node on the path from the source to each edge router is at most 1. These two constraints guarantee no loop exists on the path. Equation (1 1) ensures that the path from the source to each edge router satisfies hop limit 11 -1. Equation (12) gives the formula for calculating the vulnerability for the two paths to each destination. Equations (13) to (14) are self-explainable.
Since the edge router pair that each destination can connect to is predetermined, the two paths to each edge router pair are actually the two paths to the destination. Hence, the problem is equivalent to finding .n 2-best paths with hop limit from the source to each destination. In the following, we show the NPcompleteness of the 2-best paths problem with hop limit is NPcomplete since its special case, the 2-disjoint paths problem with hop limit, is NP-complete.
The 2-disjoint paths problem with hop limit is a special case of the min-max 2-disjoint paths problem (with unit edge cost) which was proved in I61 by a polynomial reduction from the maximum 2-satisfiability problem. In their proof, an undirected graph is constructed with edge costs varying in different positive and integral values, Since the maximum 2-satisfiability problem is strongly NP-complete, we can split an edge in the constructed graph with cost 1 into 1 unit-cost edges in series such that the proof is still valid for the min-max 2-disjoint paths problem with unit edge cost. Hence, the 2disjoint paths problem with hop limit is also NP-complete.
Lt" 1: The decision.version of the 2-best paths problem with hop limit is NP-complete.
We have the the following theorem.
Theatem I: The decision version of the best partial multicast protection tree problem is NP-complete.
Because of the NP-completeness, the problem of finding the best partial multicast protection tree is unlikely to be solved in polynomial time unless P = NP. We instead consider efficient heuristic algorithms.
HEUR~STIC ALGORITHM
In this section, we first propose a heuristic algorithm to solve the best partial multicast protection tree problem. We then derive a lower bound for the total vulnerability.
A. The PASAlgorirhm
In order to minimize the vulnerability on the two paths to each destination, we should avoid using common links on the two path. On the other hand, to minimize the total cost of the multicast session, we should increase sharing of links among paths for different destinations.
We propose the partition and sharing (PAS) algorithm which consists of four major stages. In Stage I, we construct the graph composed of nodes representing edge routes and edges representing edge router pairs. In Stage 11, we partition the edge router R into up to I R I disjoint subsets such that each subset contains at most one edge router in each edge router pair. This stage can be done using the approximation algorithm proposed for k-coloring problem [2] . In Stage In, we find a multicast tree to edge routers in each subset following in the descending order of the average node degree of all the nodes (in G). Since each path needs to satisfy the hop limit. we employ the minimum-cost path heuristic (MPH) to find a minimum-cost Steiner tree [ 111. In the MPH algorithm, the shortest path to the router closest to the source is picked and added to the partially built tree. To increase the sharing among these routers, once a path is found, we reduce the cost to zero for those links on the path. After we find the first tree, we increase the cost for those l i n b on the first tree to a large number greater than the total cost of all the links in the graph. We then find the second multicast tree to edge routers in the second subset using the MPH algorithm. This process continues until all the subset has been processed. In Stage IV, we compute the total vulnerabiiity of the multicast session. The detailed steps of the PAS algorithms are described as follows.
-AlSorith"H); to the edge router pairs is 21, a multicast tree (in the core network) is found for { B , E } consisting of paths C-B and C-F-E, as shown in dark grey lines in Figure 2(a) . The edges on the found paths are put back to the graph with their costs updated as 1 E I. Then the multicast tree for { A , D} is found consisting of paths C-F-A and C-D, as shown in light grey lines in Figure  2(a) . Thus, the total vulnerability for the multicast session is 1. As one can understand, with the hop limit increasing, the search space for edges is enlarged, which tends to yield a better solution with decreased total vulnerability. For H = 5 (the actual hop limit from C to the edge router pairs is 3), the multicast tree found for { B , E } consists of paths C-B and C-F-E, while the multicast tree found for { A ! D} consists of paths C-D-E-A and C-D, as shown in Figure 2 (b). The total vulnerability for H = 3 is only 0.
E. LowerBound
We derive a lower bound by finding the the best path pairs without hop limit for each edge router pair and summing up the vulnerability of these path pairs. We construct an auxiliary graph GI by adding nodes and edges from G. For each edge router pair { T~I , rtz}, we add one c o r n " node dl and links from ril to di and from ~1 2 to d:. We then solve the 2-best paths problem from s to d: with no hop limit using the modified K-best path (KBP) algorithm proposed in 141, where K = 2.
Before we call the modified KBP algorithm, we need construct another auxiliary graph G; by letting link capacity to be unit and adding additional nodes and links as follows. For each link ( i , j ) in GI, we add a dummy node and two artificial links from node i to the dummy node and from the dummy node to node j . The link cost and capacity of the two added links are IE'I/'2 and min{in-dey?.ee, out-degree, K } -1, respectively. We define a mapping from paths obtained from Gi to GI, denoted as l '~~ -l',; by replacing paths through artificial links to link ( i : j ) .
We 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the following, we present the simulation results of the PAS algorithm and compare them with the results given by the lower bound.
Simulations have been conducted for the PAS algorithm with randomly generated instances. The core network topology G is defined by two parameters N and U , where N =I V I is the number of nodes and U is the maximum out degree of a node. For each node vi, we randody assign its out degree U, which is uniformly distributed in { 1,2, . ' . , U ) and randomly generate d, links originating from node wi to other nodes. We then randomly assign two edge routers to each of the n destinations assuming that each node in the graph can be an edge router. Preliminary tests show that the values of N and U do not have much impact of the interest of the simulations. In our simulations, we fix N = 100, U = 8, and vary two parameters, D and H . which represent the number of destinations and the hop limit for each path from the source to each destination respectively. For each combination of parameters n and H, we generate 1000 instances. For each instance, we solve it using the PAS algorithm and compute the lower bound of the total vulnerability. The performance of the PAS is evaluated by irs 0-7803-8924-7/05/$20.00 (~) 2 0 0 5 IEEE. V. CONCLUSION Our contributions in this paper are in three folds. First, we introduced the concept of partial protection, which fills the gap between traditional 100% protection and non-protection subject to single link failure. Second, we showed the NP-completeness of the problem of' finding the best partial multicast protection tree. Third, we proposed an efficient solution, the PAS algorithm, to solve the probkm. Partial protection points out a more practical direction in network protection. The proposed PAS algorithm can also be applied to other multicasting problems. We first evaluate the performance of the PAS algorithm by fixing H at 50 and varying the number of destinations TI in {4,6;. ' I , 22). Figure 3 shows the relative error vs. the number of destinations. As shown in the figure, the relative error of the heuristic algorithm increases with the number of destination increasing, which is consistent with our expectation.
We then evaluate the performance of the PAS algorithm by fixing n at 20 and varying H in (10,20,. . ~ 100). Figure 4 shows the relative error of the PAS algorithm vs. the hop limit.
As shown in the figure, the relative error of the PAS algorithm decreases with !he hop limit increasing. When the hop limit is increased for each path. the PAS algorithm tends to find a better solution, hence the relative error is smaller. The effectiveness of the PAS algorithm is evidenced by the relative errors, which are less than 5% for all the instances we tested. The performance can be further improved by finding a better lower bound.
